Risk consists of the likelihood of an event combined with the consequence of that event. There is uncertainty associated with an estimate of risk for an event that may happen in the future. For random, "dumb" events, such as an earthquake, this uncertainty is aleatory (stochastic) in nature and can be addressed with the probability measure of uncertainty.
INTRODUCTION
First, we summarize how risk is typically evaluated for a random event. Then, we briefly discuss the belief/plausibility measure of uncertainty and fuzzy sets. Finally, we discuss how risk from potential acts of terrorism can be evaluated using belief/plausibility and fuzzy sets.
RISK FOR A RANDOM EVENT
For a safety analysis, risk is concerned with random failures, such as an earthquake, and risk can be defined as the product:
Risk -fxPxC (Eqn. 1) where f is the frequency of the initiating event (e.g., an earthquake), P is the response of system of concern (e.g., the fragility of a building), and C is the consequence if the system fails (e.g., the number of people killed). Note that the initiating event is expressed as a frequency, f P is conditional on the initiating event (e.g., the magnitude of the earthquake), and C is conditional on system failure. Using Equation 1, Risk has units of consequence per year.
Typically, more than one initiating event is of concern, and there is risk from each of"i" initiating events:
Risk, = fxP xCi (Eqn. 2)
The total risk can be expressed as the sum Total Risk = {< S,, Fi, Ci > over all i) (Eqn. 5) Using the risk triplet approach, for each scenario we have two values: the frequency of the consequence and the consequence given the scenario occurs. We can calculate the "exceedance frequency of consequence" for the collection of scenarios. Define PN(Cj) as the probability that consequence C) is exceeded given scenario Si. In general, for "i" scenarios and "j" consequences:
Freq(Cj) -ZF,xfZCj) (Eqn. 6) where Freq(CQ) is the frequency of exceedance of consequence value Ci. Uncertainty in Fi and Ci is expressed using a probability measure. For analysis of random events, probability is an appropnrate measure of uncertainty.' The variables are random variables with probability distributions.
Consider a single scenario with uncertainty for each of the variables f, P, and C. The x operation in Equation 2 represents convolution of probability distributions under multiplication. For example, assume that based on the data available, f is modeled with a lognormal probability distribution with mean I x 10-3 per year and standard deviation 3 x 10-4 per year.2 P is modeled with a lognormal probability distribution with mean 0.03 and standard deviation 0.01. C is modeled with a uniform probability distribution with minimum 1000 and maximum 7000 (mean 4000). Using equation 2, the expected value (mean) of Risk is 0.12 deaths per year. ' The name probability is used for two different concepts. The tenn P is a probability in the classical, or objective, senise; the niumber of times an event occuIs divided by the number of trials in the limit as the number of trials is infinite. The unceltainty in P (due to insufficient iniformationi to calculate the classical probability) is probability in the subjective or Bayesian sense, and it represents our state of knowledge about the likelihood of the value P. Both concepts obey the Kolmogorov axioms that mathemnatically definie a probability measure. 2 There are many probability distnrbutions available to model the uncertainty for a random variable, including: norrnal, lognormal, exponential, triangular, anid normal. Data and expertise are required to select the appropriate probability distributions for the variables of interest.
1-4244-0174-7/06/$20.00 ©2006 IEEE There is uncertainty in the Risk as represented by the probability distribution shown in Figure For example, the probability is 95% that the risk is greater than 0.03 deaths per year. The probability is 50% that the risk is greater than 0.10 deaths per year. The probability is 5% that the risk is greater than 0.27 deaths per year. The risk for this scenario can also be expressed as an exceedance frequency of consequence, as shown in Figure  2 .4 Due to uncertainty, there is a family of curves for selected percentiles of probability. With 50% probability the frequency of more than 5000 deaths is not larger than about I x 10-5 per year. With 95% probability the frequency of more than 5000 deaths is not larger than about 2 x 10-5 per year. to the crisp sets of interest. But there is a problem with our crisp sets. If 999 people die the consequence is "high" but if 1000 people die the consequence is "major"; although the crisp sets solve the problem of reasoning at too fme a level, they suffer from the problem of sharp boundaries. We really want to consider 999 deaths as both high and major to some degree, and we can do so by making our sets fuzzy. Specifically we define "minor" as Sup to about 10", "moderate" as c between about 10 and about 100", "high" for "between about 100 and about 1000", "4major" for "between about 1000 and about 1 x 104", and "catastrophic" for "greater than about 1 x 104". Degrees of membership canl be assigned to these fuzzy sets as indicated in Figure 4 . Threat is the initiating event (the terrorist act), Vulnerability is the system response (the security system response to the terrorist act), and Consequence is result of concern (e.g., deaths). Therefore, for a terrorist act, risk can be expressed in the same form as Equation 1:
where Threat is measured by fA, the frequency of the terrorist act, Vulnerability is measured by P, the probability that the act defeats the security system in place, and C is consequence.7.
For a terrorist act, risk is dependent on the scenario. Here, scenario is defined to include the adversary resources, attack plan, and target. Resources include attributes (equipment, weapons, number of attackers) and knowledge (perhaps from insiders). P is conditional on the scenario, since more resources raise the chance of adversary success, and C is conditional on the target in the scenario.
Risk must be evaluated for each of "i" scenarios as:
Risk, = 4fA x I: x Ci (Eqn. 8) We can also summarize Risk for this scenario using fuzzy sets. We implemented Yager's technique in our BeliefConvolution code to calculate belief/plausibility for fuzzy sets. [Yager, 1986] For example, assume the fuzzy sets of Figure 4 are used, where for this example the units are deaths per year. Figure 6 expresses the results in terms of these fuzzy sets.
" For this example, we use a probability distribution for C. In general, C may be assigned degrees of evidence over intervals and evaluated using the belief/plausibility measure. We can also express risk as an exceedance frequency of consequence using a belief/plausibility measure. The Pj(Cj) term in Equation 6 can be generalized to Lj(Cj) where L denotes likelihood. Using belief/plausibility, Lj(Cj) is an interval [Belief, Plausibility] . An upper bound for the exceedance frequency of consequence can be calculated using Plausibility for Li(Cj). [Darby, Evaluation of Terrorist Risk] For the example scenario, C has a probability distribution, so belief and plausibility for C are both probability, and L is a single value, the probability. Figure 7 summarizes the results for the example scenario.10 Our belief is 50% that the frequency of more than 5000 deaths is not larger than about 2.0 x 10-3 per year. Our belief is 95% that the frequency of more than 5000 deaths is not larger than about 1.7x102 peryear. Since the adversary has a choice of scenario, unless all the factors of importance to the adversary are "good" the adversary will discard a scenario and consider other scenarios. The adversary uses more of a "yes/no" decision process for such factors as:
1 Figure 4 12 To capture the significant uncertainty inherent in the defender thinking like the adversary, the model allows evidence to be assigned to combinations of fuzzy sets for each variable, and uncertainty is propagated up the rule base using the belief/plausibility measure of uncertainty. A Java code, LinguisticBelief, was written by the author to automate the evaluation. The adversary model is best explained by a simple example. 13 From the perspective of the adversary, the "Expected Consequence" for a particular scenario is defined as the consequence-as perceived by the adversary-weighted by the likelihood that the scenario can be successfully accomplished-as perceived by the adversary. It is assumed that the goal of the adversary is to maximize ADVERSARY MODEL To evaluate Equation 8 numerically using the defender model, scenarios of concern must be identified. The process of selecting scenarios requires that the defender reason from the perspective of the adversary, 'n The "percentile" curves in Figure 7 are the Belief that the frequency will not exceed the indicated value. In general, BeliegA)= I -Plausibility( A ) where A is "niot A", so the Belief of "6not exceeding frequency f" is one minus the Plausibility of "exceedi5 frequenlcy f'. In Figure 7 , the curves for 50% and 5% Belief are the same, due to the interval nature of the focal elements. The cuives in Figure 7 are straight lines due to the use of a unifonn probability distribution for consequence. The rule base reflects the following. Expected Consequence "Yes" indicates an attractive scenario for the adversary and requires that Probability Of Success (for the adversary) be "High" and Consequence be "Large". Probability of Success "High" requires a "High" value for each of the three constituent probabilities. Consequence "Large" is from Deaths and/or Damage To National Security being severe enough from the viewpoint of the adversary.
The rule base is evaluated for each scenario of concem. Assume the following evidence assigned for a particular scenario:
* The results for this scenario indicate that although the adversary (defender thinking like the adversary) estimates a "Large" consequence to be likely (belief/plausibility of 0.8/1.0), the adversary expects Probability of Success to only be "Medium" (belief/plausibility of 0.7/1.0), resulting in an overall estimate that Expected Consequence will be "Maybe" (belief/plausibility of 0.6/1.0). Since the adversary has a choice of scenarios, the adversary will examine other scenarios until ones with a high likelihood of "Yes" for Expected Consequence are identified.
There are many scenarios of concern. Scenarios can be ranked by decreasing expected consequence based on the plausibility for the worst fuzzy set for expected consequence: "Yes" in the prior example, sub-ranked iteratively by the plausibility of the next-worst fuzzy sets, "Maybe" and "No".'4 SUMMARY Evaluation of risk from acts of terrorism involves considerable epistemic uncertainty which can be captured and propagated using the belief/plausibility measure of uncertainty from the Dempster/Shafer Theory of Evidence. The risk from an act of terrorism depends on the scenario employed by the adversary and on the likelihood that the adversary selects that scenario. For a given scenario, the risk can be evaluated numerically with a defender model.
The process of selecting scenarios can be modeled linguistically with an adversary model using approximate reasoning on fuzzy sets defined for each variable. Uncertainty in the evaluation due to the defender "thinking like the adversary" is captured using the belief/plausibility measure based on evidence assigned to fuzzy sets.
